hamedandClaude Opus 5
4395eea56e
Section 11 and the third closing rule of the design document: preventing a double booking is the database's job, not the code's. Any "is it free?" check in PHP has a race window between the read and the write — two concurrent requests both see free and both write. MariaDB has no range EXCLUDE constraint, so every occupied interval is broken into fixed five-minute buckets under UNIQUE(resource_id, bucket_at, seat). The code only INSERTs; a rejection from the database *is* the answer. `seat` carries capacity: a three-bed room has seats 0..2, allocation walks upward on each collision, and the fourth concurrent hold finds nowhere to sit. Counting capacity in PHP would have rebuilt the very race this removes. Buckets are written through DBAL rather than the ORM on purpose: a unique violation raised inside flush() closes the EntityManager, and the next seat attempt would then fail with "EntityManager is closed", hiding the real outcome. Occupancy is one row per (segment × resource). The reference test asserts the payoff directly: for a 55-minute appointment of numbing / waiting / laser, the room gets three rows and the operator only two — the operator holds nothing during the wait and stays bookable for someone else. A partial hold never survives. If the second resource has no room, the first is released and the hold itself removed; otherwise a resource stays locked for an appointment that will never exist. Confirming does not re-reserve anything — the seats were taken at hold time and only the label changes. Re-reserving on confirm would reopen the race the hold closed. Cancelling marks rows `released` instead of deleting them, because the history of which resource was busy when is the input to the utilisation reports; the uniqueness buckets *are* deleted, or that interval would stay locked forever. Expired holds are released by the existing scheduler rather than a new one. That exposed a bug in my own change: the flush guard used $count, which now includes released holds, so reset([]) could pass false to save(). It is guarded on $expired. The appointment itself is still built with the existing constructor, so active_slot_key, events and the payment path behave exactly as before — the multi-resource occupancy sits beside them, not instead of them. 12 tests. Two matter most: the second hold on the same resource and interval getting 409, and a test that writes a duplicate bucket row over a *separate connection* and expects the unique-key violation — if that one ever passes silently, the guarantee had moved back into the code. 1208 tests / 3495 assertions. phpstan at its 14-error baseline. Frozen slot contract green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
132 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
132 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
# ClinicPro — API Documentation Index
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> **Base URL:** `https://clinic-pro.ddev.site`
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> **API Prefix:** `/api/v1`
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> **Swagger UI:** `https://clinic-pro.ddev.site/api/doc` — user: `admin` / pass: `clinic123`
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---
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## Authentication
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All protected endpoints require:
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```
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Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>
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```
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| Role | Description |
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|------|-------------|
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| `PUBLIC` | No token required |
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| `AUTH` | Any valid JWT |
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| `ROLE_ADMIN` | Admin user |
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| `ROLE_DOCTOR` | Doctor user |
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| `ROLE_CLINIC` | Clinic owner |
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| `ROLE_SECRETARY` | Secretary |
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---
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## Standard Response Envelope
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```json
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// Success
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{ "success": true, "data": { ... } }
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// Paginated
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{ "success": true, "data": [...], "meta": { "totalRecords": 100, "totalPages": 5, "currentPage": 1, "limit": 20 } }
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// Error
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{ "success": false, "data": null, "errors": [{ "code": "ERR_XXX_000", "message": "..." }] }
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```
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> `meta.limit` اندازهٔ صفحهٔ **واقعاً اعمالشده** است. ریپازیتوریها `limit` درخواستی را به سقف خودشان کاهش میدهند (مثلاً لیست پزشکان: سقف ۵۰)، پس برای پیمایش کامل به `meta.totalPages` تکیه کن — نه به این فرض که «تعداد آیتم کمتر از limit درخواستی یعنی صفحهٔ آخر».
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---
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## Persian digit normalization (global)
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Persian (`۰-۹`) and Arabic (`٠-٩`) digits sent in numeric request fields are translated to Latin **server-side, before the controller runs** — `src/Shared/EventSubscriber/NumericFieldNormalizerSubscriber.php`. Every client benefits: the React admin panel, `nobat724_front`, and `clinic-pro-tauri`.
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Applies to `POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` requests under `/api/v1/` with a JSON body, recursively through nested arrays.
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**Normalized keys:**
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```
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mobile, mobile_number, telephone, phone, notification_mobile,
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national_code, postal_code,
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card_number, account_number, sheba, shaba, iban,
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price_rials, amount_rials, amount, free_visit_price_rials,
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insurance_price_rials, patient_share_rials, visit_price_rials,
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duration_minutes, duration, commission_percent, coverage,
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coverage_percent, franchise, ceiling, tax_percent,
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base_insurance_discount_percent, supplementary_discount_percent
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```
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Only **digits** are translated — no characters are stripped, so `IR` in a sheba and `-` in a landline survive. Non-string values (`int`, `bool`, `null`) and keys outside the list are untouched, so a name like `منشی شماره ۲` keeps its Persian digit.
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```jsonc
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// request
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{ "mobile_number": "۰۹۱۲۳۴۵۶۷۸۹", "national_code": "۰۰۱۲۳۴۵۶۷۸", "name": "منشی شماره ۲" }
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// what the controller sees
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{ "mobile_number": "09123456789", "national_code": "0012345678", "name": "منشی شماره ۲" }
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```
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> Adding a new numeric field to any endpoint? Add its key to `NUMERIC_KEYS` in the subscriber, otherwise Persian digits reach the database.
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---
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## Modules
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| File | Domain | Endpoints |
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|------|--------|-----------|
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| [auth.md](auth.md) | Authentication — OTP, Login, JWT | 8 |
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| [doctor.md](doctor.md) | Doctor profile & addresses | 11 |
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| [clinic.md](clinic.md) | Clinics | 7 |
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| [clinic-invitation.md](clinic-invitation.md) | Doctor invitations to clinics | 8 |
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| [branch.md](branch.md) | Branches (= addresses), working hours, rooms | 8 |
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| [resource.md](resource.md) | Resources, types, skills, pools | 16 |
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| [resource-calendar.md](resource-calendar.md) | Resource calendars, exceptions, national holidays | 9 |
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| [appointment-plan.md](appointment-plan.md) | Appointment segments and plan preview | 3 |
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| [appointment-availability.md](appointment-availability.md) | Multi-resource availability search | 2 |
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| [appointment-booking.md](appointment-booking.md) | Holds, confirmation and multi-resource occupancy | 4 |
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| [appointment.md](appointment.md) | Appointments & slot booking | 6 |
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| [appointment-settings.md](appointment-settings.md) | Weekly schedule, date overrides, holidays | 14 |
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| [payment.md](payment.md) | Payments (Mellat / Sep) | 5 |
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| [settlement.md](settlement.md) | Wallet & settlement requests | 7 |
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| [rating.md](rating.md) | Ratings, comments, likes | 9 |
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| [secretary.md](secretary.md) | Doctor secretaries | 5 |
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| [representation.md](representation.md) | Representations (agents) | 6 |
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| [sms.md](sms.md) | SMS send & templates | 10 |
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| [blog.md](blog.md) | Blog posts | 6 |
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| [specialty.md](specialty.md) | Medical specialties | 5 |
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| [insurance.md](insurance.md) | Insurances & doctor-insurance links | 10 |
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| [doctor-service.md](doctor-service.md) | Doctor services | 5 |
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| [tag.md](tag.md) | Blog tags | 5 |
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| [location.md](location.md) | Provinces & cities | 10 |
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| [user-profile.md](user-profile.md) | User medical profile | 4 |
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| [admin.md](admin.md) | Admin dashboard & management | 25+ |
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---
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## Error Code Reference
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| Code | Message (FA) | HTTP |
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|------|--------------|------|
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| `ERR_AUTH_001` | توکن JWT منقضی یا نامعتبر | 401 |
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| `ERR_AUTH_002` | کد OTP نامعتبر | 401 |
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| `ERR_AUTH_003` | کد OTP منقضی شده | 401 |
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| `ERR_AUTH_004` | تعداد تلاشهای OTP به حد مجاز رسیده | 429 |
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| `ERR_AUTH_005` | نام کاربری یا رمز عبور اشتباه | 401 |
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| `ERR_AUTH_006` | دسترسی ممنوع | 403 |
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| `ERR_VALIDATION_001` | ورودی نامعتبر | 422 |
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| `ERR_VALIDATION_002` | فیلد الزامی وارد نشده | 422 |
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| `ERR_NOT_FOUND_001` | منبع درخواستی یافت نشد | 404 |
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| `ERR_CONFLICT_001` | تداخل: منبع در حال استفاده | 409 |
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| `ERR_FORBIDDEN_001` | دسترسی به این منبع مجاز نیست | 403 |
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| `ERR_PAYMENT_001` | درگاه پرداخت در دسترس نیست | 503 |
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| `ERR_PAYMENT_002` | مبلغ پرداخت نامعتبر | 422 |
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| `ERR_PAYMENT_003` | وضعیت نوبت برای پرداخت مناسب نیست | 422 |
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| `ERR_FILE_001` | فرمت فایل مجاز نیست | 422 |
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| `ERR_SMS_003` | تمپلیت قبلاً ارسال شده | 422 |
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| `ERR_SECRETARY_001` | پلن فعلی اجازه منشی بیشتر نمیدهد | 422 |
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| `ERR_RATE_LIMIT_001` | درخواستهای زیاد، بعداً تلاش کنید | 429 |
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