Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
hamedandClaude Opus 4.8 c084571bf0 fix(security): enforce doctor scope on POST my/appointment (H1)
createAppointment only checked the caller held an allowed role, then booked
onto whatever doctor_uuid the request named — a doctor could book onto any
other doctor's calendar, a clinic onto doctors outside it, a secretary outside
their scope. Add canBookForDoctor(): doctor→own only, clinic→member doctors,
secretary→active scope + appointments.create permission, admin→any.

Regression: tests/Appointment/BookingScopeTest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-28 18:52:23 +03:30
hamed e1740462b5 perf(appointment): batch-fetch pending payments in expiry loop (fix N+1)
AppointmentExpiryService ran one findPendingByAppointment query per expiring
booking. Add PaymentRepository::findPendingByAppointments (one IN query keyed
by appointment id) and use it. Test covers expiry + payment cancellation for
several appointments at once.
2026-06-28 17:10:32 +03:30
hamed 093293004a fix(security): enforce ownership on GET date-override (IDOR)
getOverride leaked any doctor's override to any authenticated user; add the
owner-or-admin check (matching the update/delete endpoints) + regression test.
2026-06-28 16:48:41 +03:30
hamed 90736c8149 fix(security): enforce ownership on GET weekly-schedule (IDOR)
getSchedule returned any doctor's schedule to any authenticated user — the
mutation endpoints (update/delete) already checked owner-or-admin but this GET
did not. Add the same check + regression test (fails without the fix).
2026-06-28 16:47:05 +03:30