Commit Graph
7 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
hamedandClaude Opus 4.8 fe6383314e fix(security): enforce ownership on 4 IDOR read/bind endpoints (M2-M5)
- M2 GET /insurance/{id}: was unguarded; now owner-or-admin (403 otherwise) —
  stops reading another doctor's negotiated price by id enumeration.
- M3 GET /clinic-pro/doctor-address/{id}: add the same owner/admin check the
  sibling PATCH/DELETE already had.
- M4 POST/PATCH /service-item: staff_uuid must belong to the caller's tenant
  (entity_type/entity_id) → 422; stops binding another tenant's staff.
- M5 appointment-settings list endpoints (date-override/holidays/
  available-locations): add the per-doctor ownership check the sibling
  single-record endpoints already enforce.

Regressions (6 negative cases fail without the fixes):
DoctorInsuranceOwnershipTest, DoctorAddressOwnershipTest,
ServiceItemStaffOwnershipTest, AppointmentSettingsListOwnershipTest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-28 20:17:52 +03:30
hamedandClaude Opus 4.8 6b12f3ddb9 perf(doctor): fetch-join specialties in clinic doctor list (H6)
findByClinicWithFilters left-joined specialties only for filtering, so
toListArray() lazy-loaded them per doctor (N+1). addSelect them and switch the
result fetch to Paginator(fetchJoinCollection: true) so LIMIT still paginates by
doctor.

Test infra: ApiTestCase::countQueries() (via doctrine.debug_data_holder).
Regression: tests/Doctor/ClinicDoctorListNPlusOneTest asserts the query count
does not grow with doctor count (4→10 without the fix).

Also relaxed AppointmentExpiryServiceTest's exact-count assertion (it counts all
stale pendings in the shared db_test, which accumulates) — logged test-isolation
debt as E6.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-28 19:24:49 +03:30
hamedandClaude Opus 4.8 aa87b4a9cb fix(db): prevent double-booking a slot via unique active_slot_key (H2)
A non-unique index on (doctor_id, slot_start) plus a count-then-insert check
left a TOCTOU race: two concurrent requests could both pass isSlotTaken and
both insert. wrapInTransaction alone doesn't stop the phantom under InnoDB
REPEATABLE-READ.

Add a nullable, unique active_slot_key on Appointment = "doctorId:slotStart"
while the booking occupies the slot (pending/confirmed — in lockstep with
isSlotTaken); NULL once expired/completed/no_show/cancelled (NULLs don't collide
in a MySQL unique index, so released slots rebook freely). bookAtomically now:
catches the unique violation -> SlotTakenException, and expires lapsed pendings
in-transaction so the ~1-min window before the expiry cron doesn't wrongly block
rebooking. All three booking paths (online / my / admin) routed through it.

Migration backfills one row per (doctor, slot) — the latest id — so the index
builds even on dirty historical data without destructively cancelling bookings.
(Backfill surfaced a real pre-existing double-booked slot in dev data.)

Regression: tests/Appointment/SlotUniquenessTest. Adjusted the expiry-service
test fixture to use distinct slots (one live booking per slot is now enforced).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-28 19:04:54 +03:30
hamedandClaude Opus 4.8 c084571bf0 fix(security): enforce doctor scope on POST my/appointment (H1)
createAppointment only checked the caller held an allowed role, then booked
onto whatever doctor_uuid the request named — a doctor could book onto any
other doctor's calendar, a clinic onto doctors outside it, a secretary outside
their scope. Add canBookForDoctor(): doctor→own only, clinic→member doctors,
secretary→active scope + appointments.create permission, admin→any.

Regression: tests/Appointment/BookingScopeTest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-28 18:52:23 +03:30
hamed e1740462b5 perf(appointment): batch-fetch pending payments in expiry loop (fix N+1)
AppointmentExpiryService ran one findPendingByAppointment query per expiring
booking. Add PaymentRepository::findPendingByAppointments (one IN query keyed
by appointment id) and use it. Test covers expiry + payment cancellation for
several appointments at once.
2026-06-28 17:10:32 +03:30
hamed 093293004a fix(security): enforce ownership on GET date-override (IDOR)
getOverride leaked any doctor's override to any authenticated user; add the
owner-or-admin check (matching the update/delete endpoints) + regression test.
2026-06-28 16:48:41 +03:30
hamed 90736c8149 fix(security): enforce ownership on GET weekly-schedule (IDOR)
getSchedule returned any doctor's schedule to any authenticated user — the
mutation endpoints (update/delete) already checked owner-or-admin but this GET
did not. Add the same check + regression test (fails without the fix).
2026-06-28 16:47:05 +03:30