fix(security): per-mobile OTP cap + refresh-token rotation (M6, M7)

M6: send-code rate-limited only per IP, so a victim's number could be
SMS-flooded from rotating IPs. Add a per-mobile bucket (same 5/hour policy)
keyed by the validated mobile.

M7: /oauth/token/refresh reused the presented refresh token verbatim (no
rotation) and never re-checked the user. The rotation infra already existed
(issueTokens mints a fresh refresh token) — the controller just discarded it.
Now revoke the presented token (single-use), issue a fresh pair, and reject a
suspended user (status != 1).

Regressions: tests/Auth/SendCodeMobileRateLimitTest,
tests/Auth/RefreshTokenRotationTest (both fail without the fix).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/api/auth.md

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ Send OTP code to mobile number.
 |------|------|-------------|
 | `ERR_VALIDATION_001` | 422 | Invalid mobile format |
 | `ERR_AUTH_004` | 429 | OTP rate limit exceeded |
+| `ERR_RATE_LIMIT_001` | 429 | بیش از حد مجاز — هم per-IP (۵ در ۶۰ دقیقه) و هم **per-mobile** (۵ در ۶۰ دقیقه؛ ضد flood از IPهای چرخشی) |
 
 ---
 
@@ -219,18 +220,23 @@ Refresh expired JWT using refresh token.
 }
 ```
 
+> **چرخش (rotation):** هر refresh token **یک‌بارمصرف** است. با هر فراخوانی، توکن ارائه‌شده باطل می‌شود و یک جفت `access_token` + `refresh_token` تازه صادر می‌گردد. توکن قبلی دیگر کار نمی‌کند (`401`). کاربر **معلق** (`status != 1`) نمی‌تواند refresh کند.
+
 ### Response `200`
 ```json
 {
-  "token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9...",
-  "refresh_token": "def50200..."
+  "access_token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9...",
+  "refresh_token": "<توکن جدید — با قبلی فرق دارد>",
+  "token_type": "Bearer",
+  "expires_in": 900,
+  "refresh_token_expires_in": 2592000
 }
 ```
 
 ### Errors
 | Code | HTTP | Description |
 |------|------|-------------|
-| `ERR_AUTH_001` | 401 | Invalid or expired refresh token |
+| `ERR_AUTH_001` | 401 | Invalid/expired/already-rotated refresh token, or suspended user |
 
 ---
 

docs/audit-backlog.md

@@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ _None outstanding._
 | ✅M3 | IDOR read: `showAddress` loads any DoctorAddress by id, no owner check | src/Doctor/Controller/DoctorController.php:559 | security-idor | **DONE** — ownership mirror of PATCH/DELETE. `tests/Doctor/DoctorAddressOwnershipTest` |
 | ✅M4 | IDOR write: ClinicService `createItem`/`updateItem` bind staff via global `staffRepo->findByUuid()`, no entity-scope check (cross-tenant staff binding) | src/ClinicService/Controller/ClinicServiceController.php:157,195 | security-idor | **DONE** — staff must match tenant (entity_type/id) → 422. `tests/ClinicService/ServiceItemStaffOwnershipTest` |
 | ✅M5 | IDOR read: AppointmentSettings list endpoints leak any doctor's config — `listOverrides`, `listHolidays`, `availableLocations` (no ownership on {doctorUuid}) | src/Appointment/Controller/AppointmentSettingsController.php:150,256,349 | security-idor | **DONE** — ownership added to listOverrides/listHolidays/availableLocations. `tests/Appointment/AppointmentSettingsListOwnershipTest` |
-| M6 | OTP send-code has no per-mobile/per-uuid cap, only per-IP (5/hr) → SMS flood from rotating IPs | src/Auth/Controller/AuthController.php:136-153 · OtpService.php:59-77 · rate_limiter.yaml:4-7 | security-ratelimit | Request many codes one mobile across IPs → per-number cap enforced |
-| M7 | Refresh token not rotated on use (same raw token 30d), never re-checks user status | src/Auth/Controller/AuthController.php:477-480 · TokenService.php:33-45 | security-auth | Call refresh twice → new token issued each time, suspended user rejected |
+| ✅M6 | OTP send-code has no per-mobile/per-uuid cap, only per-IP (5/hr) → SMS flood from rotating IPs | src/Auth/Controller/AuthController.php:136-153 · OtpService.php:59-77 · rate_limiter.yaml:4-7 | security-ratelimit | **DONE** — per-mobile limiter (5/hr) added alongside per-IP. `tests/Auth/SendCodeMobileRateLimitTest` (6 reqs / 6 IPs → 6th 429). |
+| ✅M7 | Refresh token not rotated on use (same raw token 30d), never re-checks user status | src/Auth/Controller/AuthController.php:477-480 · TokenService.php:33-45 | security-auth | **DONE** — single-use rotation (revoke old + issue new) + suspended-user (status!=1) rejected. `tests/Auth/RefreshTokenRotationTest`. |
 | M8 | N+1: secretary list lazy-loads secretary/doctor ManyToOne per row | src/Secretary/Controller/SecretaryController.php:192,213 | perf-nplus1 | Profiler secretary list → ~2 queries/row |
 | M9 | N+1: billing claims lazy `items` + `insuranceRepo->find()` per claim in enrichClaims | src/Billing/Controller/BillingController.php:~49,68 | perf-nplus1 | GET claims → items+insurance query/claim |
 | M10 | Unbounded list: `listMine` settlements `findByUser` no limit | src/Settlement/Controller/SettlementController.php:193 | perf-pagination | GET settlement list → paginate |

src/Auth/Controller/AuthController.php

@@ -147,6 +147,13 @@ class AuthController extends BaseController
             return $this->error(ErrorCodes::ERR_VALIDATION_001, 'فرمت شماره موبایل نادرست است', 422, 'mobile');
         }
 
+        // Per-mobile cap (in addition to per-IP) so a victim's number can't be
+        // SMS-flooded from rotating IPs.
+        $mobileLimiter = $this->sendCodeLimiter->create('mobile:' . $mobile);
+        if (!$mobileLimiter->consume(1)->isAccepted()) {
+            return $this->error(ErrorCodes::ERR_RATE_LIMIT_001, ErrorCodes::message(ErrorCodes::ERR_RATE_LIMIT_001), 429);
+        }
+
         $uuid = $this->otpService->sendCode($mobile);
 
         return new JsonResponse(['uuid' => $uuid, 'message' => 'کد تایید با موفقیت ارسال شد.']);
@@ -470,14 +477,15 @@ class AuthController extends BaseController
         $result = $this->tokenService->refreshToken($refreshToken);
         $user   = $this->userRepo->find($result['userId']);
 
-        if ($user === null) {
+        if ($user === null || $user->getStatus() !== 1) {
             return $this->error(ErrorCodes::ERR_AUTH_001, ErrorCodes::message(ErrorCodes::ERR_AUTH_001), 401);
         }
 
-        $tokens                   = $this->tokenService->issueTokens($user);
-        $tokens['refresh_token']  = $result['rawToken'];
+        // Rotate: the presented refresh token is single-use. Revoke it and issue a
+        // fresh access + refresh pair, so a stolen token can't be reused.
+        $this->tokenService->revokeRefreshToken($refreshToken);
 
-        return new JsonResponse($tokens);
+        return new JsonResponse($this->tokenService->issueTokens($user));
     }
 
     #[OA\Get(

tests/Auth/RefreshTokenRotationTest.php

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+<?php
+
+namespace App\Tests\Auth;
+
+use App\Auth\Entity\User;
+use App\Auth\Service\TokenService;
+use App\Tests\ApiTestCase;
+
+/**
+ * Refresh tokens are single-use (rotated on every refresh) and a suspended user
+ * cannot refresh. Guards against replaying a stolen refresh token.
+ */
+class RefreshTokenRotationTest extends ApiTestCase
+{
+    private function issueRefresh(User $user): string
+    {
+        return static::getContainer()->get(TokenService::class)->issueTokens($user)['refresh_token'];
+    }
+
+    private function refresh(string $token): array
+    {
+        $this->client->request(
+            'POST',
+            '/oauth/token/refresh',
+            server: ['CONTENT_TYPE' => 'application/json'],
+            content: json_encode(['refresh_token' => $token]),
+        );
+
+        return json_decode($this->client->getResponse()->getContent(), true) ?? [];
+    }
+
+    public function testTokenIsRotatedAndOldOneRevoked(): void
+    {
+        $this->client->disableReboot();
+        $user = $this->createUser();
+
+        $old  = $this->issueRefresh($user);
+        $body = $this->refresh($old);
+        $this->assertSame(200, $this->responseCode());
+
+        $new = $body['refresh_token'];
+        $this->assertNotSame($old, $new, 'refresh token was not rotated');
+
+        // the old token is now single-use-spent → rejected
+        $this->refresh($old);
+        $this->assertSame(401, $this->responseCode());
+
+        // the new token still works
+        $this->refresh($new);
+        $this->assertSame(200, $this->responseCode());
+    }
+
+    public function testSuspendedUserCannotRefresh(): void
+    {
+        $this->client->disableReboot();
+        $user = $this->createUser();
+        $token = $this->issueRefresh($user);
+
+        $user->setStatus(0);
+        $this->em->flush();
+
+        $this->refresh($token);
+        $this->assertSame(401, $this->responseCode());
+    }
+}

tests/Auth/SendCodeMobileRateLimitTest.php

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+<?php
+
+namespace App\Tests\Auth;
+
+use App\Tests\ApiTestCase;
+
+/**
+ * send-code must cap requests per mobile number, not only per IP — otherwise a
+ * victim's number can be SMS-flooded from rotating IPs.
+ */
+class SendCodeMobileRateLimitTest extends ApiTestCase
+{
+    public function testPerMobileCapHoldsAcrossDifferentIps(): void
+    {
+        $this->client->disableReboot();
+        $mobile = '0912' . str_pad((string) random_int(0, 9_999_999), 7, '0', STR_PAD_LEFT);
+
+        $statuses = [];
+        for ($i = 0; $i < 6; $i++) {
+            // each request from a different IP → the per-IP limiter never fires
+            $this->client->request(
+                'POST',
+                '/api/v1/user/send-code',
+                server: ['REMOTE_ADDR' => "10.20.30.$i", 'CONTENT_TYPE' => 'application/json'],
+                content: json_encode(['mobile' => $mobile]),
+            );
+            $statuses[] = $this->client->getResponse()->getStatusCode();
+        }
+
+        // send_code limit is 5/hour → the 6th for the same mobile is rejected
+        $this->assertSame(429, $statuses[5], 'per-mobile cap not enforced: ' . implode(',', $statuses));
+        $this->assertNotContains(429, array_slice($statuses, 0, 5));
+    }
+}